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Abstract 
The selected effects or ‘etiological’ theory of Proper function is a naturalistic and realist 
account of biological teleology. It is used to analyse normativity in philosophy of language, 
philosophy of mind, philosophy of medicine and elsewhere. The theory has been developed 
with a simple and intuitive view of natural selection. Traits are selected because of their 
positive effects on the fitness of the organisms that have them. These ‘selected effects’ are 
the Proper functions of the traits. Proponents argue that this analysis of biological teleology 
has the unique advantage that the selected effect function of a trait is also a causal 
explanation of the trait: the trait exists because it performs this function. We show, however, 
that selected effect functions as currently defined explain the existence of traits only under 
highly restrictive assumptions about evolutionary dynamics. In many common scenarios in 
which traits evolve by natural selection, selected effect functions do not explain those traits. 
This is because definitions of selected effect function extract from any evolutionary scenario 
only the information that would be explanatorily relevant in the simple evolutionary scenario 
implicit in those definitions. When applied to more complex scenarios selected effect 
functions omit the key information that is explanatorily relevant in those scenarios. The 
assumptions required for selected effect functions to be explanatory are particularly unlikely 
to hold in the domain that its proponents care most about - the evolution of representation. A 
more adequate selected effects theory of Proper functions may be possible, but will require 
much greater attention to the structure of actual evolutionary explanations. 
 
1. Introduction 
Teleological language in biology, such as the ‘function’, ‘purpose’ or ‘goal’ of some part or 
process, can be interpreted as an elliptical reference to natural selection. 
 
"If we ask 'What does a cat have sharp, curved claws for?' and answer simply 'To catch 
mice with', this does not imply a profession of any mythical teleology, but the plain statement 
that catching mice is the function whose survival value, by the process of natural selection, 




In the Darwinian modern synthesis this idea was known as ‘teleonomy’ (Pittendrigh 1958), a 
term chosen to clearly demarcate it from the early 20th century idea that teleology is an 
emergent property of living things (Nicholson and Gawne 2015). 
 
The teleonomic approach to biological function has been widely adopted by philosophers as 
a result of Ruth Millikan’s influential Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories 
(1984) and Karen Neander’s influential but unpublished PhD thesis and subsequent papers 
(Neander 1983; 1991a; 1991b). These philosophers sought to define the true or ‘Proper’ 
functions of biological traits - to explain why it is the Proper function of the nose to warm and 
filter inhaled air and not its Proper function to support spectacles, however well it performs 
that function (Voltaire 1759). Their analysis of teleological language was essentially the 
same as that popularised in the modern synthesis, “The gist of this… theory is that the (or a) 
function of an item... is what it was selected to do.” (Neander 2017, 20). They did not adopt 
the term ‘teleonomy’, perhaps because their immediate influences were other philosophers 
(e.g. Wright 1973) rather than biologists. Instead, philosophers call this the ‘etiological’ or 
‘selected effects’ theory of Proper function. 
 
Whilst usage differs, we find it helpful to use ‘Proper function’ to mean functions which 
provide some sort of objective criterion of what is normal or pathological, intact or broken, 
well-functioning or dysfunctional. It is the aspiration of the selected effects theory to identify 
the Proper functions of traits. We use ‘selected effects function’ to refer to the actual 
functions picked out by the selected effects theory, remaining neutral on whether these are 
in fact Proper functions (or, indeed, whether Proper functions exist). 
 
Advocates of the theory claim that what distinguishes it from other interpretations of 
teleological language in biology is that only functions so defined - selected effects functions - 
causally explain why traits exist. The jewel-like colours of the male Superb Fairy Wren exist 
today because ancestral males with brilliant colours survived and reproduced more 
effectively than they would have without them. In ancestral wrens, the colours increased 
fitness by attracting mates, so in today’s wrens the selected effect function of these colours 
is to attract mates. The wren’s colours have other effects, such as attracting wildlife 
photographers, but only the first effect is what colour is for: the colour exists because it has 
this effect. This special explanatory role is what makes it the ‘Proper’ function of the trait. 
 
Neander makes clear that this special explanatory role is the basic rationale for the selected 
effects theory of Proper function: "That the koala's pouch has the function of protecting its 
young does seem to explain why koalas have pouches. That the bee's dance is for directing 
other bees to pollen does seem to explain why bees dance" (Neander 1991b, 457). She 
continues, "...my view is that function attributions universally and intrinsically justify 
teleological explanations" (Neander 1991b, 458). They do so as a result of, “a causally 
explanatory selection process, during which those items or traits were selected for those 
effects which are their functions” (Neander 1991b, 467). 
 
Leaping forward twenty-eight years, Justin Garson, the most prominent current advocate of 
the selected effect theory, still treats the claim that functions causally explain traits as a key 
argument for that theory: 
 
“consider a puzzling feature of ordinary biological usage, namely, function’s explanatory 
depth: sometimes function statements are causal explanations for traits. When biologists say 
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the function of the zebra stripes is to deter biting flies, for example, they’re trying to explain 
why zebras have stripes. … If we take explanatory depth seriously, then the traditional 
selected effects theory, or something in its neighborhood, has no equal.” (Garson 2019, 7) 
  
Our concern in this paper is that selected effect functions only explain the existence of the 
traits that bear them under restrictive assumptions about evolutionary dynamics. When we 
drop these assumptions, the claim that selected effects functions causally explain traits 
becomes highly problematic. Selected effects functions almost always provide some 
information that is explanatorily relevant to the evolution of traits. But in many cases they 
discard the key explanatory information about the evolution of the trait. They do this because 
they extract from an evolutionary explanation only information that would be explanatorily 
relevant if the assumptions about evolutionary dynamics that are implicit in the selected 
effects theory held. When those assumptions do not hold, presenting the Proper function as 
the evolutionary explanation, rather than the actual evolutionary explanation, is a 
straightforward misrepresentation of why the trait evolved. The key elements of the actual 
evolutionary explanation have been deliberately omitted from this ‘explanation’ and the 
selected information presented in an explanation corresponds to an evolutionary scenario 
which did not occur. 
 
We show below that selected effects functions fail to explain traits when the process of 
natural selection feeds back onto the relative fitness of those traits. Such feedback 
generates a form of environmental heterogeneity that is endogenous to the selection 
process. Exogenous environmental heterogeneity can also create evolutionary scenarios in 
which traits are not explained by their selected effects functions. Both endogenous and 
exogenous environmental heterogeneity are ubiquitous in evolution. Proper function 
theorists have not had to confront these problems because they use simple, intuitive 
examples of natural selection presented via verbal scenarios. These scenarios assume a 
uniform selective environment. But when that assumption is dropped, then it is not generally 
true that selected effects functions explain the traits that bear them.  
 
Selected effects functions fail to explain these traits in the straightforward sense that when 
the actual evolutionary explanation of how such a trait evolved is fed into the definition of 
selected effect function, the resulting function ascription is not a summary or sketch of the 
actual evolutionary explanation.  By the ‘actual evolutionary explanation’ we mean the 
explanation found in the scientific literature. The selected effects function of a trait is derived 
from facts about the evolution of the trait, and both we and selected effects theorists have no 
choice but to rely on evolutionary biology to estimate those facts if we want to apply the 
theory. We give concrete examples below of traits whose evolution is well understood, but 
when the explanation is fed into selected effects definitions of function that understanding is 
discarded and the case treated as if the trait evolved in a very different way.  
 
Our criticism is not tied to any specific philosophical theory of scientific explanation, which is 
fortunate given the lack of consensus on that topic (Woodward and Ross 2021). However, 
we can clarify our criticism using an idea from that literature, namely an ‘ideal explanatory 
text’ containing all the information about an event needed to answer any why-question we 
might pose about that event (Railton 1981). A scientific explanation extracts some of that 
information and a good explanation extracts the right information to answer a specific 
question. We show below that the question the selected effects theory of function asks is 
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always “what were the circumstances under which the trait increased the fitness of its 
bearers relative to rivals with alternative traits?” The selected effects theory implicitly 
assumes that an answer to this question is also an answer to the question “why did this trait 
evolve?” But these two questions are often not equivalent. In many important evolutionary 
scenarios the two questions extract very different information from the ideal explanatory text. 
Selected effects function ascriptions almost always convey some information from the ideal 
explanatory text about the evolution of the trait. In the problematic cases, however, this is 
not the right information. It is wrong in the straightforward sense that it does not include the 
key pieces of information that an evolutionary biologist would select to explain why the trait 
evolved. 
 
We expect that many selected effects theorists will see this as mere quibbling about 
technicalities. However complex real evolutionary explanations may be, surely this cannot 
undermine the basic insight that the appearance of teleology in nature is due to natural 
selection? But this is not a responsible attitude given the weight that philosophers want to 
put on the selected effects theory. Philosophers want to identify the Proper functions of traits 
so that they can, for example, define the truth-conditions of mental and/or linguistic 
representations (Millikan 1984; 2017; Neander 2017). They use their theory to distinguish 
the normal from the pathological in medicine and psychiatry (Wakefield 1992; Neander 
1998; Garson 2022). Here and in other areas of philosophy they try to ground normative 
claims on facts about Proper function or dysfunction. The humble observation that natural 
selection reduces the puzzle of apparent design in nature cannot support the ambitious 
conclusion that multiple domains of normative facts are reducible to facts about natural 
selection. Instead, selected effects theorists need to demonstrate that this ambitious 
program can be carried out. Their claim to identify ‘Proper’ functions rests squarely on the 
claim that selected effects functions causally explain the existence of the traits that bear 
them.  If this is not true, then the selected effects theory is simply one amongst many 
definitions of function and its judgements about what is ‘Proper’ cannot bear the weight 
philosophers put on them.  
 
The situation here is similar to the situation in evolutionary theory with respect to the links 
between natural selection and adaptation. It is widely believed that natural selection 
consistently leads to adaptation. This is assumed as a working hypothesis in some subfields 
of evolutionary biology such as behavioural ecology. But being widely believed is no 
substitute for rigorous demonstration. R.A. Fisher’s 1932 “fundamental theorem of natural 
selection” (Fisher 1999) was long supposed to be such a demonstration. This theorem 
states that the genetic variance in fitness in a population, at a given time-- which measures 
the strength of natural selection -- is equal to the rate of increase in the mean fitness in this 
population. Mean fitness has been taken as a proxy for adaptation (see Okasha 2018, chap. 
3). However, this interpretation was contentious even before Price (1972) gave the 
fundamental theorem what is now its standard interpretation. On this interpretation, natural 
selection has two types of effects: direct and indirect (via the environment). While the direct 
effects lead to an increase in mean fitness, when the indirect effects are taken into 
consideration, an overall increase in mean fitness is not guaranteed. So the fundamental 
theorem does not, in fact, imply that natural selection always produces adaptation. The 
formal Darwinism project of Alan Grafen (see Grafen 2014) is a more recent attempt to forge 
a rigorous link between natural selection and adaptation. In this case too, it is unclear that 
the project delivers the required demonstration (see the 2014 special issue on the topic in 
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Biology and Philosophy and edited by Okasha and Paternotte).  Two philosophers who have 
examined the question in considerable depth, Jonathan Birch (2016) and Samir Okasha 
(2018), both conclude that the hopes for finding a general link between natural selection and 
adaptation are bleak. Our analysis, although less formal, reveals that the widely accepted 
link between selected effect function and evolutionary explanation is similarly lacking any 
firm foundation. It, too, assumes an unwarranted link between episodes of selection and the 
course of evolution. We hope that selected effect theorists will take this on board and dig 
into the evolutionary details to see if their program can really be carried out. Until this work is 
done the selected effects theory is only hand-waving at natural selection to lend an air of 
respectability to normative intuitions. 
 
In section two we compare the most influential statements of the selected effects theory and 
extract a canonical version. In the process we reveal a surprising degree of vagueness in 
even the best current statements of the theory. In section three, the longest section of the 
paper, we substantiate our criticism by demonstrating the failings of selected effects function 
in a range of important evolutionary scenarios. In section four we identify why the selected 
effects theory is unable to handle these scenarios and use this analysis to generalise our 
criticism. 
 
We note that one move available to selected effects theorists is to restrict the scope of the 
theory to those cases where its assumptions about evolutionary dynamics hold. This would 
already be a major concession, but in section five we also show that those assumptions are 
least likely to hold in just those domains of greatest interest to philosophers, namely the 
evolution of representations. 
2. Selected effects definitions of Proper function 
There are many formulations of the selected effects theory of Proper function. Here are four 
influential examples: 
  
(Defn. 1.) “…for an item A to have a function F as a "Proper function", it is necessary 
(and close to sufficient) that… A originated as a "reproduction" (to give one example, 
as a copy, or a copy of a copy) of some prior item or items that, due in part to 
possession of the properties reproduced, have actually performed F in the past, and 
A exists because (causally historically because) of this or these performances. 
(Millikan 1989, 288) 
 
(Defn. 2.) “It is a/the Proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that 
which items of X's type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O's ancestors, and 
which caused the genotype, of which X is the phenotypic expression, to be selected 
by natural selection.” (Neander 1991a, 74). 
  
(Defn. 3.)  “Where i is a trait of systems of type S, a Proper function of i in S's is F iff 
a proximal selective explanation of the current non-zero proportion of S's with i must 
cite F as a component in the fitness conferred by i.” [‘proximal’ means recent 




(Defn. 4.)  “The function of m is to F iff: 
(i) m is a member of family T, 
(ii) members of family T are components of biologically real systems of type 
S, 
(iii) among the properties copied between members of T is Property or 
Property cluster C, which can do F, 
(iv) one reason members of T such as m exist now is the fact that past 
members of T were successful under selection in the recent past, through 
positively contributing to the fitness of S, and 
(v) members of T were selected because they did F, through having C.” 
(Godfrey-Smith 1994, 359) 
  
Nicholas Shea is another influential selected effects theorist. He defines Proper function for 
the specific case where a trait has the Proper function of carrying information about a state 
of affairs, for example, a state of the visual system carrying information about the orientation 
of a stimulus. Shea’s definition, (Defn. 5), requires that “an evolutionary explanation of the 
current existence of the representing system adverts to Rs [the trait] having carried 
information about C [the state of affairs]” (Shea 2007, 419) 
 
The differences between these definitions are dwarfed by their similarities. All share the idea 
that a selected effect function is an effect whose positive effect(s) on fitness plays a role in 
explaining why a trait evolved by natural selection. Exactly what role the positive effect on 
fitness must play in an evolutionary explanation is less clear from these definitions. Shea 
says that the evolutionary explanation ‘adverts to’ the effect. Neander says that the effect 
“caused the genotype... to be selected by natural selection” (Neander 1991a, 174). Godfrey-
Smith says that the trait was “successful under selection in the recent past, through 
positively contributing to… fitness” (Godfrey-Smith 1994, 359). Both Neander and Godfrey-
Smith’s formulations are naturally interpreted as requiring that the effect caused an increase 
in the proportion of the trait relative to its alternatives. Griffiths takes a slightly different tack – 
a selective explanation of the observed proportion of the trait needs to include this effect on 
fitness if it is to correctly predict the observed proportion. But all the definitions agree that the 
positive effects of the trait on individual fitness must be used to explain the representation of 
the trait in the target population.  
 
Selected effects theorists have given surprisingly little attention to how much influence 
selection must have to count as an explanation of the trait. Griffiths’s formulation is both the 
most precise and the weakest: any positive effect of the trait on fitness whose omission from 
a model would reduce the ability of that model to predict the course of evolution is a selected 
effect function. Godfrey Smith requires that there be positive selection in the recent past, 
and that this selection is one reason we observe the trait in the target population. Both these 
formulations suggest that any positive effect of a trait on selection, however weak, is 
sufficient to confer a function. Population geneticists often think of the ‘strength’ of a 
selection pressure in terms of the probability that the trait will become fixed1 in the population 
in some period of time. Traits will sometimes become fixed when it was much more likely 
they would go extinct, a feature of evolution which takes on considerable importance when 
effective population sizes are small. If the unlikely survival of the trait was slightly less 
 
1 A trait is fixed when all members of the population have the trait. 
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unlikely due to some effect, then that effect is a selected effect function of the trait on 
Griffiths’s and perhaps Godfrey-Smith’s definitions. But what explains the persistence of the 
trait in such cases is overwhelmingly luck. Considerations like these have led some 
philosophers to suggest that traits have Proper functions to some degree rather than as an 
either/or matter (Matthewson 2020). We will not pursue this suggestion here. 
 
Neander and Millikan’s language suggests stronger requirements than Griffiths’ or Godfrey 
Smith’s on what influence selection must have to count as an explanation. Neander says the 
effect must have ‘caused’ the selection of the relevant genes. Millikan says the trait “exists 
because (causally historically because)” of the effect (1989, 288). But selection scenarios 
range from those where it is near inevitable that the trait will be represented in future 
populations to those where it is possible but unlikely, and we are left to guess where the line 
is to be drawn. Given that assignments of selected effect function are meant to clarify 
problematic distinctions in psychology, medicine, and so forth this is highly unsatisfactory. 
 
In contrast to these neglected areas, there has been extensive discussion of whether the 
selected effect functions of a trait are the effects which led to its initial spread in the 
population or whether they are the effects it was recently selected for and, if so, what is 
meant by ‘recent’? (Griffiths 1993; Godfrey-Smith 1994).  But our concerns apply whichever 
period of evolution is supposed to define function, so we can set this dispute aside. 
 
The most careful definition of Proper function in the philosophical literature is undoubtedly 
that of Millikan (1984). Definitions 1-5 all state or imply that the trait which has the Proper 
function is the same trait, in some sense, as the trait that was selected in ancestral 
populations. Millikan spells this out in more detail with her definition of a ‘reproductively 
established family’ of trait tokens.2 What Millikan calls a ‘family’ of traits biologists call a 
‘homologue’ - a set of traits related to one another by descent from a common ancestor. 
 




2 Millikan writes: “First we define the notion ‘ancestor of a member of a reproductively established 
family’: 
(1) Any member of a (first-order) reproductively established family from which a current member m 
was derived by reproduction or by successive reproductions is an ancestor of m. 
(2) Any temporally earlier member of a (higher-order) reproductively established family which member 
was produced by an ancestor of the device that produced a present member m is an ancestor of m. 
(3) Any earlier member of a (higher-order) reproductively established family that a present member m 
is similar to in accordance with a Proper function of a producer that produced both is an ancestor of 
m.” 
(Millikan 1984, 27–28) 
Note that ‘reproductively established families’ are not lineages of organisms (e.g. wrens) or even 
lineages of characters in the familiar sense of a ‘transformation sequence’ of characters like the 
transformation sequence from scales to feathers. Instead, they are lineages of individual characters: 
one blue head is the ‘ancestor’ of another blue head and all the homologous blue heads are a ‘family’. 
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(Defn 6) “Where m is a member of a reproductively established family R and R has 
the reproductively established or Normal character C, m has the function F as a 
direct3 Proper function iff: 
1. Certain ancestors of m performed F. 
2. In part because there existed a direct causal connection between having the 
character C and performance of the function F in the case of these ancestors 
of m, C correlated positively with F over a certain set of items S which 
included these ancestors and other things not having C. 
3. One among the legitimate explanations that can be given of the fact that m 
exists makes reference to the fact that C correlated positively with F over S, 
either directly causing reproduction of m or explaining why R was proliferated 
and hence why m exists.” (Millikan 1984, 28) 
  
Restating Millikan’s definition using conventional biological terminology will make it easier to 
apply her theory to realistic biological examples. These terms are organisms (we could say 
‘’genes, organisms, or groups”), populations and characters. In comparative biology 
‘character’ refers to what philosophers call a ‘determinable Property’ and ‘character state’ to 
what philosophers call a ‘determinate Property’. For example, head colour is a character of 
which blue and brown are possible character states. Turning blue for the breeding season is 
a character of which March to October and Never are two possible character states. A table 
of equivalences between Millikan’s terminology and the conventional terms in biology is 
given as an Appendix. 
 
We will also depart from Millikan’s formulation by defining Proper function for the members 
of a population, not for a specific individual. The constant m in Millikan’s definition refers to a 
trait of a specific individual, such as the blue head of the fairy wren that one of us saw while 
working on this article  - let’s call him Walter. But the actual evolutionary explanations that 
biology produces explain facts about populations. So in our definition what is assigned a 
Proper function is not Walter’s blue head in particular, but blue heads in the population of 
which Walter is a member. Given that we are assigning functions to members of a 
population, we also state the definition in terms of what explains the proportion of the trait in 
a population, not why it ‘exists’. Presumably a trait ‘exists’ if the proportion in some 
population is greater than zero. 
 
Our proposed canonical statement of the selected effects theory of Proper function is: 
  
(Defn. 7.) Consider a population of organisms some of whom have character state Ci. 
These organisms are descendants of organisms with Ci and their character states 
are homologous. In this population, Ci has effect F as a Proper function if and only if: 
7.1. In some ancestral populations there was variation in C 
7.2. Having state Ci caused some ancestral individuals to produce effect F 
with higher probability than individuals with alternative character states 
 
3 Millikan’s distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘derived’ functions will not concern us here. Very briefly, 
her idea is that objects which do not have a history of natural selection, such as the stones in the case 
of a Caddis fly larva, can nevertheless have Proper functions ‘derived’ from the Proper function of the 
mechanisms that make the stone case.  
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7.3. Performing F caused some ancestral individuals with Ci to have 
greater reproductive output than they would have had if Ci had been changed 
to an alternative character state extant in that ancestral population (Cj) 
7.4. The frequency of Ci in the current population is influenced by selection 
for Ci in these ancestral populations in virtue of the increase in fitness 
accruing to individuals with Ci from performing F more frequently than 
individuals with alternative character states 
 
From Defn. 7, we can clearly see the general structure of the selected effects account: 
 
● Condition 7.1 is necessary if natural selection is to operate.  
● Condition 7.2 establishes a causal connection between our focal trait and its 
effect  
● Condition 7.3 mechanistically connects our focal trait and its effect with a 
fitness advantage over individuals with alternative character states.  
● Condition 7.4 connects our trait, its effect, and its fitness advantage over 
competing traits, with the spread of the trait in the population.  
 
When all four conditions are satisfied, F is the selected effects function of the trait.   
 
3. When do selected effects functions explain 
traits? 
In the sections that follow, we will highlight common evolutionary scenarios in which there is 
incongruence between the actual evolutionary explanation and explanation offered by a 
selected effect function. By the ‘actual evolutionary explanation’ we mean the explanation 
found in the current scientific literature. The selected effects function of a trait is derived from 
facts about the evolution of the trait, and both we and selected effects theorists have no 
choice but to rely on evolutionary biology to estimate what those facts are if we want to apply 
the theory.  
 
In each example, we follow a four-step process: (i) introduce the evolutionary scenario and 
state the background assumptions; (ii) state the actual evolutionary explanation; (iii) fill out 
Defn. 7, obtaining a statement of Proper function; and (iv) demonstrate the incongruence 
between the actual evolutionary explanation (from i) and the explanation offered by the 
selected effect function (from iii).  
 
3.1 No coevolution: Proper function successfully explains zebra 
stripes 
We will begin by exploring Garson’s example: "the function of zebra stripes is to deter biting 
flies" (Garson 2019). For simplicity, imagine that zebra stripes are determined by the action 
of an allele at a single haploid locus and that zebras reproduce clonally (this implies the 
simplest possible form of heredity and is a common idealisation in population genetics). Let 
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us assume that biting flies have a predilection for Non-striped individuals (Caro et al. 2014; 
2019), and that this preference does not evolve.  
 
We now state the actual evolutionary explanation: in an ancestral population of non-striped 
individuals, there once arose a striped individual through mutation, who on account of being 
subject to fewer fly bites, was able to survive and reproduce more efficiently than non-striped 
individuals, a process that continued unabated until all Non-striped individuals had been 
replaced by striped individuals. 
 
Now we will define the variables and fill out Defn. 7. Let the character C be Pattern, of which 
we assume there are two variants: the striped trait Ci (denoted Stripes), and the non-striped 
trait Cj (denoted Non-stripes). The effect, F, of Stripes to reduce the probability of being 
bitten by flies is denoted Reduce_Bites. We can fill out Defn. 7 as follows. 
 
Consider a population of organisms some of whom have Stripes. These organisms are 
descendants of organisms with Stripes and their character states are homologous. In this 
population, Stripes has effect Reduce_Bites as a Proper function if and only if: 
 
Z1. In some ancestral populations there was variation in Pattern 
Z2. Having Stripes caused some ancestral Striped individuals to Reduce_Bites with higher 
probability than Non-striped individuals. 
Z3. Reduce_Bites caused some ancestral Striped individuals to have greater reproductive 
output than they would have had if Stripes had been changed to Non-stripes in that 
ancestral population. 
Z4. The frequency of Stripes in the current population is influenced by selection for Stripes in 
these ancestral populations in virtue of the increase in fitness accruing to Striped individuals 
from Reducing_Bites more frequently than Non-striped individuals. 
 
In this case, the explanation offered by the selected effect function is congruent with the 
actual evolutionary explanation because the selective regime is invariant with respect to the 
fitness advantage of Striped individuals over Non-striped individuals. 
3.2 Coevolution: Proper function fails to explain zebra stripes 
In the example above, we made a number of simplifying assumptions. In particular, we 
assumed that biting flies could not evolve their preference for non-striped organisms. We 
now relax this assumption and consider a scenario in which there is a coevolutionary arms 
race between zebra stripes and the preference trait of biting flies. 
 
Imagine that biting flies can evolve their preferences for Pattern (assume that a single fly 
either specialises on Stripes or on Non-stripes). We assume that biting flies can evolve 
rapidly and that the more frequent a Pattern, the stronger the selective force acting on biting 
flies to specialise upon it. The strength of selection increases with the frequency of a Pattern 
because the more common a Pattern, the more frequent the encounter rate between flies 
and that type, which increases the advantage an individual fly would gain by specialising on 
that Pattern. Let us assume that when Stripes evolved, the majority of mammal species 




In this scenario, biting flies evolved to specialise on (common) Non-striped species, and 
Striped zebras simply happened to possess a phenotype to which the biting fly was not 
coadapted: Stripes Reduces_Bites because it is a rare phenotype. The actual evolutionary 
explanation is that being a rare phenotype Reduces_Bites. Indeed, if Stripes were to rise in 
frequency and become the dominant Pattern---or if Striped species had originally been the 
majority type---the biting fly would specialise on Stripes. In this case, Stripes would instead 
increase bites, highlighting why an evolutionary explanation centered around how Stripes 
Reduce_Bites would be deeply misleading. 
 
Crucially, the Proper function ascription (Z1-Z4) does not change despite the addition of 
coevolutionary dynamics to this scenario. There is no way for Defn. 7 to incorporate the fact 
that Stripes Reduces_Bites in some contexts (when Non-Striped species are most common) 
but increases bites in other contexts (when Striped species are most common). As such, 
there is now an incongruence between the explanation offered by the selected effect 
function and the actual evolutionary explanation. 
 
Such coevolutionary dynamics between hosts and parasites are well-studied in the context 
of Red Queen dynamics and can lead to a range of different evolutionary dynamics 
(Brockhurst et al. 2014). For example, when host-parasite coevolutionary feedbacks occur 
over a short timescale, we expect to see fluctuating selection. Such dynamics might occur if 
we were to assume that zebras are the only host of biting flies, and that the traits for the 
biting preference of flies and stripes of zebras evolve at a similar rate. In this case, the 
frequency of Stripes would oscillate from low to high along with a time-lagged oscillation of 
the frequency of the biting fly preference trait (Brockhurst et al. 2014). Under such dynamics, 
it is clearly problematic to claim that what explains the proportion of Stripes is that it has the 
effect Reduce_Bites when roughly half the time Stripes actually increase bites. There is, 
however, no easy way out of this quandary because our selected effect function cannot 
incorporate information about coevolutionary dynamics. 
 
Our aim in this section is to show that implicit assumptions about evolutionary dynamics are 
made whenever a Proper function explanation is constructed. We are not trying to show that 
the historical evolution of zebra stripes actually involved coevolution with biting fly 
preference. It is sufficient that numerous examples of natural selection to which we might 
hope to apply a selected effect function explanation do involve coevolutionary dynamics e.g. 
parasitic cuckoos (Servedio and Lande 2003), plant-insect mutualisms (Bronstein et al. 
2006), and as we will discuss later, the evolution of signalling and communication. An 
explanation involving coevolutionary dynamics could be the correct explanation for any given 
evolutionary scenario, and whenever this is the case, the explanation offered by the selected 
effect function will be incongruent with the actual evolutionary explanation. In the next 
section, we show how another common evolutionary dynamic, negative frequency-
dependence, can lead to incongruence. 
3.3 Frequency-dependent selection in the Gouldian finch 
In this section we show in more detail using a real case how negative frequency 
dependence undermines the idea that the selected effect function of a trait is also an 
evolutionary explanation of that trait. We start with the simple, textbook evolutionary 
scenario known as the ‘Hawk-Dove game’. 
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In this game-theoretic scenario, two strategy types (Hawkish vs Dovish) can persist in a 
population despite the fact that the payoff to “Hawks” always exceeds the payoff to “Doves” 
when the two interact. Even though Hawkish individuals always prevail over Dovish 
individuals, the costs to Hawks of their interactions with other Hawks are high. Hawks can, in 
effect, be considered “their own worst enemy.” As the proportion of Hawks in the population 
rises and Hawk-Hawk interactions become more likely, the average payoff to Hawks 
decreases and the average payoff to Doves increases. The equilibrium ratio of Hawks to 
Doves is such that the average fitness of the two types is equal. 
 







 (𝑉, 0) 







Fig 1. Payoff matrix for the Hawk-Dove game (V = value of contested resource, C = cost of 
conflict) 
 
A natural example of this evolutionary game has been observed in the spectacular Gouldian 
Finch of northern Australia (Kokko et al. 2014). Simplifying somewhat, the species has two 
heritable character states or morphs, red-headed and black-headed. The two morphs mate 
assortatively, their mating preference sustained by the fact that hybrid offspring have 
reduced fitness. Red-heads have elevated production of testosterone and corticosteroids 
which causes them to compete aggressively and exclude black-heads from nesting cavities. 
Red-headed finches can accordingly be depicted as exhibiting the Hawkish strategy in a 
suitable game-theoretic model. As the proportion of red-heads in a population increases, so 
too will the cost of competition due to the increased frequency of encounters with other red-
headed finches. This reduces the resources (time, energy) available to red-headed birds for 
parenting. Black-headed birds, whose Dovish strategy invests more resources in parenting 
and less in conquest, subsequently raise more successful broods. In wild populations, the 
two types persist alongside one another at around three black to one red and with 
occasional gene flow between them. A selected effect function explanation for the existence 
of either heritable character state should preserve the core of the actual evolutionary 
explanation, which is that each exists at a level that represents equilibrium in frequency 





Fig 2. Gouldian Finches, Ó suwatsir / Adobe Stock 
 
What are the functions of these behavioral traits in Gouldian finches? We can apply Defn. 7 
to determine the selected effect function of the Hawkish phenotype of red-headed finches: 
Consider a population of finches, some of whom have elevated production of 
testosterone and corticosteroids (“Elevated”). These organisms are descendants of 
finches with Elevated and their character states are homologous. In this population, 
Elevated has defeating rivals for nesting cavities as a Proper function because: 
  
H1. In some ancestral populations there was variation in production of 
testosterone and corticosteroids (Elevated vs. Reduced) 
H2. Elevated caused some ancestral Elevated individuals to defeat rivals 
for nesting cavities with higher probability than individuals with 
Reduced 
H3. Defeating rivals for nesting cavities was causally responsible for some 
ancestral Elevated individuals having greater reproductive output than 
they would have had if Elevated had been changed to Reduced 
H4. The frequency of Elevated in the current population is influenced by 
selection for Elevated in these ancestral populations in virtue of the 
increase in fitness accruing to Elevated individuals from defeating 




Defn. 7 could also be applied, mutatis mutandis, to determine the selected effect function of 
the Reduced phenotype of black-headed finches, whose function will be to conserve 
resources for investment in the young. This definition assigns a function in both cases, but 
the claim that the function of each trait explains that trait is highly problematic. 
The fact that Elevated has the selected effect function <defeating rivals for nesting cavities> 
is supposed to answer the question, “what explains the frequency of Elevated in the current 
population?” The actual evolutionary explanation is that selection is frequency dependent 
and takes the population to an equilibrium frequency where the fitness of the two types is 
equal. The selected effect function explanation discards this information and includes only 
some information about why Elevated was sometimes fitter than Reduced. This 
misrepresents how Elevated evolved, attributing it to positive fitness differences in some 
patches of the environment, rather than to negative frequency dependence. As well as 
misrepresenting the actual explanation, the selected effect function simply fails to answer 
the question. The fact that Elevated is sometimes fitter than Reduced does not explain why 
the frequency of Elevated is 25% or even why Elevated coexists with Reduced at any 
frequency, rather than being fixed. 
A possible response by the selected effect theorist is to change the question. They can ask 
“why does Elevated exist” (why is its frequency greater than zero)? But the selected effects 
function is also a poor explanation of why Elevated exists. The models used to construct the 
actual evolutionary explanation of the Gouldian finch polymorphism reveal a “population 
fitness valley, [where] hawks are competent enough to take over nest sites from doves and 
to breed relatively successfully, but are still not successful enough to maintain the 
productivity of the population in the absence of the healthy population growth that doves 
provide” (Kokko et al. 2014, 4). In these scenarios the hawkish red-heads really are their 
own worst enemy, and in the absence of dovish black-heads there is a collapse in the red-
head population. The actual evolutionary explanation of why red-heads exist is essentially 
about the interaction between the two morphs. 
It was the desire to fit cases of negative frequency dependent selection into the theory of 
selected effect functions that led Griffiths (1993) to offer Defn. 3 (see above). Griffiths fitted 
these cases by weakening the sense in which selected effect functions ‘explain’ traits. He 
required only that the selected effect function ascription convey some information that needs 
to be included in a complete model of the evolution of the trait. But that information isolated 
from other key facts of the case may be a very poor explanation, as we have just seen. 
It is also worth noting that in some evolutionary scenarios Elevated simply does not have a 
selected effects function. Take the scenario where a population of red-headed individuals is 
invaded by a small number of black-headed individuals. Perhaps red-heads found a new 
population in unoccupied territory where they initially avoided the costs of conflict through 
sheer abundance of nest sites. As black-headed birds spread, the proportion of red-headed 
birds will decline until it reaches equilibrium. Throughout this process red-heads have lower 
(relative) reproductive fitness than black-heads. Defn. 7 will not apply in this case because 
clause H.3 is unfulfilled. It was never the case in the actual evolution of the observed 
equilibrium frequencies that Elevated (red-headedness) had higher reproductive output than 
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Reduced (black-headedness). So Reduced does not have a selected effect function if the 
population reached equilibrium by this trajectory.  
This is not a ‘counterexample’ - this specific scenario is merely a dramatic version of what 
will happen in any scenario where a population overshoots the equilibrium frequency, by 
drift, founder effects, selective predation or whatever. The point is not that Defn 7 fails to ‘get 
it right’ in one or more possible cases, but that Defn 7 reflects a fundamentally impoverished 
picture of how natural selection explains outcomes. 
In negative frequency dependent selection the selective environment changes as a result of 
selection: selection is an endogenous source of environmental heterogeneity. In the 
following section, we consider an extension of selected effects theory that has been 
formulated specifically to deal with heterogeneous environments: Millikan’s concept of 
‘Normal’ conditions. We begin by introducing ‘Normal’ conditions and then show why this 
idea does not allow selected effect function theorists to deal with selection in heterogeneous 
environments. 
3.4 Normal Environments 
The idea of the Normal (big ‘N’) is an important part of Millikan’s theory of selected effect 
function: “I capitalize Normal — to distinguish it from normal in the sense of average.”  
(Millikan 1984, 34, italics in original). To be Normal is to be the way things were on actual, 
historical occasions on which a trait successfully performed its functions. Normal conditions 
are “conditions in which [the trait] has historically been when it actually performed F - these 
conditions being uniform over as large a number of historical cases as possible.” (Millikan 
1984, 33). A Normal explanation is one that explains how F is performed under these 
Normal conditions. A Normal character is a character state that features in a Normal 
explanation (see Appendix 1). 
 
Millikan’s Normal conditions are not the same thing as the normal environment the trait 
encountered in its evolution. The normal (small ‘n’) environment in that sense includes both 
environments in which the trait was historically successful and environments in which it was 
historically unsuccessful. It is both normal for rabbits to escape predators and normal for 
rabbits to be eaten. But for Millikan, only environments in which the rabbit escapes, and 
moreover escapes in the same way it escaped in the past, are Normal conditions in which 
the rabbit’s anti-predator adaptations perform their Proper functions in accordance with a 
Normal explanation. Normal conditions are the benign environments in which the trait can 
perform its function successfully in just the way it performed it in the evolutionary past.4 
 
4 Millikan needs her concept of Normal for two reasons. The first is to distinguish a trait performing its 
function ‘Normally’ (Proper functioning) from the trait performing the same function merely 
adventitiously. When a male Superb Fairy Wren has an extra-pair copulation because the female 
wren remembers that he was the first local male to turn blue in spring his blue head performs its 
Proper function in accordance with a Normal explanation. But suppose a male wren has an extra-pair 
copulation because the owner of an aviary picks the bluest wrens in an effort to breed males who are 
constitutively blue. According to Millikan, the blue trait does not have its effect as a Proper function in 
this case because it does not produce the effect in accordance with a Normal explanation. 
 
The second role of Millikan’s Normal is to explain how a trait can evolve when it almost always fails to 




Millikan says that Normal conditions “are the conditions to which the device that performs 
the Proper function is biologically adapted.” (Millikan 1984, 34). This suggests that the 
problems identified in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 can be solved by focusing only on evolution in 
Normal environments, since these are the ones in which adaptation occurs. But rather than 
solving the problem, this is merely another way to reveal it. In the scenarios we have 
described it is not possible to explain the evolution of the trait by concentrating solely on how 
it evolves in Normal conditions. Whether a trait succeeds in evolutionary competition 
depends on its relative fitness in the expected environment, a weighted average of 
environments in which the trait occurs, not merely its relative fitness in environments to 
which it is particularly well suited.5  ‘Biologically adapted to’ in Millikan’s theory simply does 
not refer to evolutionary adaptation, it means something like ‘has high fitness in’.  
 
The idea of Normal explanation thus divides the environment into Normal patches, where 
the character state is advantageous, and abNormal patches where the character state is not 
advantageous. The abNormal patches are ignored in the Normal explanation of how the 
character state affects fitness and hence in the selected effects function explanation of why 
we observe that character state in the target population (See Defn. 6). This means that 
these selected effects explanations will often be poor explanations, since actual evolutionary 
models of selection in patchy environments must consider how the trait performs in both 
advantageous (Normal) and disadvantageous (abNormal) patches. We will now explain this 
using an example of bet-hedging in heterogeneous environments. 
3.5 Heterogeneous environments and bet hedging 
Evolution in patchy environments, whether spatial or temporal, does not involve an 
evolutionary response to a single kind of patch independently of what is happening in other 
patches (Brandon 1990). Organisms evolve to deal with the heterogeneity inherent in the 
environment, responding to a probability distribution over possible environments with which 
they may have to cope. Evolutionary responses to such patchy environments often take the 
form of traits that embody a ‘bet-hedging’ strategy. A bet-hedging strategy is one that 
minimises variance in reproductive output. (Olofsson et al. 2009) This aim can be achieved 
in a couple of ways. An organism can adopt a “conservative” bet-hedging approach in which 
it follows the same low-risk strategy for all environments (e.g. laying a clutch of same-sized 
eggs). Even if this strategy is suboptimal for any given environment, it can minimise variance 
by avoiding particularly poor reproductive performance in unfavourable environments. On 
the other hand, an organism might adopt a “diversified” bet-hedging approach in which it 
utilises a wider range of strategies (e.g. laying eggs of different sizes). Despite this approach 
 
because the Normal condition of the presence of an egg is not met. Most sperm are in an abNormal 
environment (Millikan 1984, 34) 
 
Reliance on this notion of Normality rather than the notion of a normal environment as that in which 
the trait evolved creates problems when selected effects theorists try to understand diseases as 
failure to perform Proper functions (Matthewson and Griffiths 2017; Bourrat and Griffiths In Press) 
 




being risky for any specific strategy, it can lower reproductive variance because at least one 
strategy is likely to be well-matched for any given environment. (Olofsson et al. 2009) 
 
When two strategies have the same arithmetic (additive) mean reproductive outputs, the 
effect of minimising the variance in reproductive output for one of those two strategies is to 
increase its geometric (multiplicative) mean reproductive output. One implication of this is 
that, if environmental conditions vary enough to cause temporal fluctuation in a trait's effects 
on reproductive output, an invading mutant trait with a lower arithmetic mean reproductive 
output may spread on account of its geometric mean reproductive output being sufficiently 
larger than the resident's (Gillespie 1974; Beatty and Finsen 1989). To illustrate, consider a 
simple example of conservative bet-hedging. Imagine two environments - one good and the 
other bad - that occur with equal probability. Suppose that an organism which does not 
hedge its bet has a relative reproductive output of 1 in the good environment and a relative 
reproductive output of 0.5 in the bad environment. That organism’s arithmetic mean 
reproductive output is 1 * 0.5 + 0.5 * 0.5 = 0.75 and its geometric mean reproductive output 
is √1 ∗ 0.5 = 0.707. Consider now an organism employing conservative bet-hedging that has 
a reproductive output of 0.71 in both good and bad environments. Its arithmetic and 
geometric fitnesses are both 0.71. Since natural selection is a multiplicative or compounding 
process, the bet-hedging organism has a higher expected number of offspring (a good proxy 
of fitness), despite having a lower arithmetic expectation.  
 
A canonical biological example of bet hedging is seed dormancy in annual plants. For many 
annual plants, the environmental conditions for seedling establishment and reproduction can 
vary widely from year to year. Although a strategy in which all seeds germinate the following 
year is optimal when conditions are predictably good, such a strategy risks catastrophic 
failure if the following year is a drought. To get around this, some annual plants evolve a 
diversified bet-hedging strategy in which they produce seeds that germinate in different 
years (a so-called “seed bank" (Childs et al. 2010)). We will now use an example of bet 
hedging in plants to demonstrate how Normal explanations can be incongruent with actual 
evolutionary explanations. 
 
Imagine that each year the environment is either good or drought. All seeds that germinate 
in a good year survive, but all seeds that germinate in a drought year die. Assume that trait 
Ci causes half the seeds to germinate in the following year and half the year after, and a trait 
Cj causes all seeds to germinate the following year. Furthermore, assume that the effect F of 
Ci is to decrease the proportion of seeds that germinate in drought, which it does more 
efficiently than Cj.  
 
The diversified bet-hedging works by limiting losses in drought years so that ultimately more 
seeds can germinate in good years. If all seeds die once a drought hits, then there are no 
seeds left to germinate in the next good year. Crucially, to understand whether the bet-
hedging trait will spread, we must account for drought and good environments as well as 
their respective likelihoods (the ‘small n’ normal environment). Millikan’s concept of Normal 
conditions, however, isolates one of these environments and attempts to explain a trait’s 
existence solely based on its performance in this Normal environment. As a result, if we tried 





In this example, we believe that Millikan would apply the idea of Normal explanation to 
individual seeds. For example, we might say that the Normal environment for a seed is the 
good one, and that the Normal explanation for how the seed performs its function of 
germination is that it germinates in the good environment. But this omits the key piece of 
explanatory information concerning the bet-hedging strategy, namely that the reason some 
seeds produced by a plant with the bet-hedging trait can germinate in a good environment is 
because they did not germinate during drought years. We could try reversing the explanation 
and assigning drought as the Normal environment. In this case, the Proper function of the 
seed would be to not germinate in the drought environment, but this omits explanatory 
information about germinating in good years. Whichever choice we make, the Normal 
explanation only tells part of the story. Ultimately, to make sense of how traits evolve in 
heterogeneous environments, we must invoke both the Normal and abNormal environments 
(i.e., we must consider the ‘small n’ normal environment). Since a selected effects function 
only contains information about events in the (big-N) Normal environment, it will not be a 
good explanation of how the trait evolved. 
 
In the next section we will draw together the threads from these three examples and identify 
the same underlying problem with selected effects explanations in each case.  
 
4. When and why selected effect functions do not explain 
The special virtue of the selected effects theory of Proper functions is supposed to be that 
selected effects functions explain the traits that bear them. Male fairy wrens have blue heads 
because those heads attract mates. The selected effects theory is built upon the following 
picture of evolution: An organism with character Ci has selected effect function F because 
performing F gave it a reproductive advantage over an organism with character Cj. Repeated 
rounds of interaction between Ci and Cj individuals, typically resulting in a reproductive 
advantage for Ci, explain the existence of Ci. We have shown that this simple, intuitive 
picture often does not hold.  
 
In sections 3.2 and 3.3 we described a hypothetical case with biting flies and an actual case 
with Gouldian finches where the interactions between Ci and Cj individuals change the 
selective environment. The selective environment includes not only biotic and abiotic factors 
external to the population but also the relative frequency or density of conspecific 
competitors. The process of selection is an endogenous source of heterogeneity in the 
selective environment. As selection changes the selective environment this feeds back and 
alters the payoffs for Ci and Cj, such that Ci’s reproductive advantage may vanish or even 
reverse. The fate of the population depends on the dynamics that emerge from this feedback 
process. However, the definition of selected effects function means that a function ascription 
cannot convey this crucial information. It can only convey information about the subset of 
environments in which Ci is fitter than Cj. 
 
In section 3.4 we examined a case of exogenous environmental heterogeneity - seed-
banking in plants. The essential feature of an evolutionary explanation of this kind is that it 
considers both what happens in patches where a trait is fitter than its competitor and in 
patches where it is less fit than in its competitor. Once again, the definition of selected 
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effects function means that a function ascription cannot convey this crucial information. It 
can only convey information about the subset of environments in which Ci is fitter than its 
competitors. We saw that this limitation is also built into Millikan’s concept of a Normal 
explanation. 
 
The heart of the problem is that the selected effects theory assumes that the most 
explanatorily relevant information about the evolution of a trait is information about 
occasions when that focal trait was fitter than its rivals. This assumption is correct only when 
selection occurs in a uniform environment. In the common and important evolutionary 
scenarios we have described above the assumption is false. When there is a heterogeneous 
selective environment, occasions where the focal trait is less fit than its rivals are equally 
relevant. Whether the focal trait evolves depends on both. When environmental 
heterogeneity is produced endogenously, by the selection process itself, then the most 
explanatorily relevant information is the dynamics produced by the feedback between 
selection and relative fitnesses. That is what explains the fate of the population, and whether 
the focal trait evolves. 
 
In essence, the selected effects definition of function takes the actual evolutionary 
explanation of a trait and selects the information that would explain the evolution of that trait 
if it evolved in an environment composed predominantly of patches where that focal trait is 
fitter than its rivals. When this assumption is correct, the selected effects function explains 
the trait. When it is false the selected effect function is either a poor explanation or the 
definition implies that the trait has no selected effect function, despite the fact that it evolved 
by natural selection. Equally importantly, in all the scenarios we have outlined selected effect 
functions are misleading explanations - by selecting just the information that would be 
relevant if the trait had evolved in a way that is not how it actually evolved, they suggest that 
this is how the trait evolved.  
 
We suspect that many selected effects theorists will respond to our arguments by admitting 
that the theory has trouble with complex cases but insisting that it remains a good, simple 
starting point for thinking about biological function. But a simple model is only truly simple if it 
makes the right simplifications. Explanations in evolutionary biology typically take the form of 
verbal or mathematical models. All such models are of course abstractions or re-
presentations of the phenomena studied. These abstractions are useful because they isolate 
elements that influence important features of the modeled system. In mathematical 
modelling, a well-designed model abstracts away extraneous aspects while retaining those 
that meaningfully influence the dynamics of the process under investigation. If a modeller 
removes important components, then their inferences will go astray. Consider a real-life 
example. In the early 1990s, models were used to support the hypothesis that uniparental 
(maternal) inheritance of mitochondria drove the evolution of mating types (primitive sex 
cells) (Hurst and Hamilton 1992; Hutson and Law 1993). Twenty-years later, another paper 
came to the opposite conclusion (Hadjivasiliou et al. 2013). What happened? The early 
models made a simplifying assumption that inadvertently removed negative frequency-
dependent dynamics from the models, which altered the evolutionary dynamics of the traits 
and led to the opposite inference (Hadjivasiliou et al. 2013). Considerations such as these 
are precisely the reason that evolutionary biology is built upon quantitative principles. 
Models serve as a check on intuition, and they safeguard against minor conceptual errors 
that might lead our inferences astray. The shortcomings exhibited by current definitions of 
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selected effect function are just the kind that make for unreliable, potentially misleading 
generalisations from the simple case to the general case. The examples presented in 
Section 5 will make this dramatically clear.  
 
We should not overstate our case against selected effect function explanations. We do not 
deny that selected effect functions can explain traits when none of the evolutionary 
phenomena highlighted above are present. Nor do we hold that trait-environment feedback 
always poses a problem for selected effect function explanations. For example, negative 
frequency-dependent interactions might be weak, such that the fitness of trait Ci diminishes 
as it spreads but nevertheless always remains higher than the fitness of alternative Cj until Ci 
has displaced Cj. Likewise, positive frequency-dependent dynamics show how trait-
environment feedback can cause Ci’s fitness to increase as its frequency relative to Cj 
increases. These cases (and possibly others) are similar enough to the simple, intuitive 
evolutionary scenarios implicit in the definition of selected effect function as to not cause too 
many problems. But, as we have shown, numerous examples of evolutionary dynamics do 
not correspond even approximately to this simple model.  
 
In the following section, we hope to motivate selected effects theorists to take our criticisms 
seriously by showing that they apply with particular force to the case many of them care 
about most, the evolution of representation. 
5. Signalling and selected effects function 
The inadequacy of the selected effects theory is particularly marked in the domain of 
greatest interest of many selected effects theorists: the ascription of functions to 
representations used in signalling and communication. This was Millikan’s primary aim in 
developing her theory of Proper function, and explaining representational states is also the 
central aim of Neander and of Shea (Shea 2007; Neander 2017). However the evolution of 
representational states is the frequency dependent process par excellence, because the 
best naturalistic models of how communication evolves are inescapably co-evolutionary, in 
ways similar to the examples discussed in Section 3 (see also Maynard-Smith and Harper 
2003; Scott-Phillips 2008; Skyrms 2010).  
Signals succeed in representing states of the world because senders and receivers have 
adapted to each other’s conditional behaviours.  In the natural world, such information-
bearing signalling systems evolve for a variety of competitive or cooperative reasons. They 
evolve between different species, such as in the stotting displays of Thompson’s Gazelles to 
their predators, and within the same species, such as with sexual signalling or alarm calls 
(Zahavi 1975; Grafen 1990; Skyrms 2010); and even within the same organism, as in gene 
regulation (Calcott et al. 2018). Following (Lewis 1969), the same game-theoretic framework 
is applied to the evolution of language and other human conventions, modelling alignments 
of interest (and other details) in a variety of ways (Huttegger 2007). Human representational 
communication likely evolved as early hominins became more reliant on conspecifics and 
divisions of labour, with language both driving and exploiting the evolution of more complex 
cognition, social structures, and associated incentives (Planer and Sterelny 2021). Different 
mechanisms are involved in the evolution of signals in these different contexts, but they all fit 
the sender-receiver framework and all can be modelled using evolutionary game theory 
(Skyrms 2010; Huttegger and Zollman 2013; Brusse 2020). 
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But if these explanations are correct, then they cannot be re-expressed as function 
ascriptions via the selected effects theory. As in the case of the Gouldian finches, the 
evolution of signalling systems is highly frequency dependent. The fitness or success of 
sender and receiver behaviours in any given context depends on the prevalence of 
complementary behaviours which would complete the informational circuit. There is no 
advantage in sending a veridical signal if no-one is responding favourably to it, and no 
advantage in being poised to respond to signals that are not forthcoming or are poorly 
correlated with reality. Sender and receiver behaviours each constitute the selective 
environment of the other, and dynamically co-evolve. There is an extensive body of 
simulation work which demonstrates this. The likelihood of signalling systems evolving is 
highly sensitive to the initial mix of behaviours, especially as various modelling idealisations 
are relaxed (Pawlowitsch 2008; Hofbauer and Huttegger 2008; Huttegger and Zollman 2013; 
Brusse and Bruner 2017). And even in relatively simple signalling games there are also 
common, evolutionarily significant conditions under which the frequencies of sender and 
receiver behaviours permanently fluctuate, due to being sometimes advantageous and 
sometimes disadvantageous in relation to each other (Zollman et al. 2013; Bruner et al. 
2017; Kane and Zollman 2015). This is akin to the co-evolutionary dynamic we see between 
hosts and parasites (as in the zebra stripes example), and can be expected in realistic cases 
when the interests of senders and receivers are not in perfect alignment. 
The problems here for the selected effects theory run deeper though, because the rare 
special cases where it works best are also least desirable as standard bearers for a theory 
of communication and representation. There are indeed real-world examples where either 
signal or response behaviours ‘hold still’ for the other to adapt to, and we can identify a 
selected effects function which aligns with its evolutionary explanation. But these are all 
clear-cut cases of parasitic exploitation or manipulation. A famous example is the Ophrys 
speculum orchid’s mimicry of the morphology and pheromones of a receptive female 
Campsoscolia ciliate wasp, manipulating the highly conserved mating strategy of the male 
wasps. In the human context, we could likewise attribute clear explanatory functions to lies 
told to the hopelessly gullible. But these are all unnatural, exceptional cases, in the sense 
that some factor requiring further explanation (mating strategies, maladaptive stupidity) acts 
to restrain receivers from adapting to the deception. And they are also decidedly awkward to 
serve as paradigm cases of communication; awkward at least for proponents of the selected 
effects theory. 
6. Where now for selected effect theories of Proper function? 
The aspiration of selected effect theories is to identify the Proper functions of traits. Proper 
functions are the ‘real’ or ‘true’ functions of those traits and so can be used to assess 
whether traits are normal or pathological, intact or broken, well-functioning or dysfunctional. 
The claim that selected effects functions are Proper functions rests squarely on the claim 
that selected effects functions, alone amongst the many competing definitions of biological 
function, causally explain the existence of the traits that bear them. Some will dispute 
whether this special explanatory role gives these functions the normative force their 
proponents claim, but without the special explanatory role their claim to have that normative 




We have shown that in a wide range of realistic and important cases of natural selection, 
selected effect functions as currently defined do not explain the traits that bear them. In most 
cases, if a trait has a selected effect function, then that function conveys some explanatorily 
relevant information about the evolution of the trait. But in the cases we have described that 
information is merely a fragment and very far from an explanation of the trait. One possible 
response for selected function theorists is to weaken the claim that selected effects functions 
explain traits to the claim that selected effects functions have some explanatory relevance to 
why traits exist. This, however, would undermine the claim that selected effects functions 
have a unique explanatory role, since rival definitions of function such as the ‘organisational’ 
theory also meet this new, weaker criterion (Mossio et al. 2009; Garson 2016). The 
‘organisational function’ of a trait is the role that trait plays in the ability of a system to 
maintain itself in a living state - this surely has some explanatory relevance to why the trait 
exists! Moreover, even the most marginal role in natural selection would confer a selected 
effects function on this new and weaker criterion. Selected effects theorists like to contrast 
the Proper function of the heart in circulating the blood with the mere effect of the heart in 
making a noise. But stethoscopes have been around for a long time and have saved many 
lives, and under the new interpretation this would give them some explanatory relevance 
and thus a selected effect function. Perhaps, contra Voltaire, noses even have the proper 
function of supporting spectacles after all! 
 
Alternatively, selected effects theorists may wish to maintain the strong link between 
selected effect function and evolutionary explanation by restricting the application of the 
theory to just those traits that evolved according to the simple, intuitive picture of evolution 
implicit in the theory. This more restrictive approach is no less problematic, however. 
Frequency dependent selection, environmental heterogeneity, and more generally the 
coevolution of traits and their selective environments---which may include other organisms of 
the same or different species---are extremely widespread (Yoshimura and Clark 1993; 
Asmussen et al. 2004; Brockhurst et al. 2014).6 Moreover, we have shown that key domains 
of interest to selected effects function theorists, such as representational states in 
communication, violate the assumptions about evolution implicit in the theory. To limit the 
domain of selected effects function to traits where those assumptions hold would render the 
account of very limited interest to philosophy.  
 
Selected effects function theorists have long recognized that where the theory is applicable 
depends on the nature of the selection process: “Differences between biological and artifact 
functions arise because of the different nature of the selection process involved in the two 
cases” (Neander 1991a). We have taken this a step further by showing that the theory as 
currently formulated applies to only some simple forms of natural selection. If the theory is to 
apply to a wider range of cases it will need to be reformulated to take account of the nature 
of selection in those cases. Confronting the complexities of real evolutionary explanations 
may allow for the development of a richer and sophisticated theory that reforges a strong link 
between function and evolutionary explanation. Reformulating the theory quantitatively may 
be required (Matthewson 2020). But until this work is done, the idea that normative intuitions 
 
6 It will also be important to assess the viability of the selected effects theory of function in light of 
niche construction theory (Odling-Smee et al. 2003) but here we appeal only to issues that arise 
within the most conventional, neo-Darwinian picture of evolution. 
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can be naturalised by appealing to evolution, influential in so many areas of philosophy, 




Appendix: Millikan’s technical terminology and conventional 
biological terminology 
  




Homologue of genes or 
genotypes. In molecular 
biology, orthologs, paralogs 
and xenologs will all count as 
‘families’ of genes. 









16S rRNA, femur, courtship display of 
the Great Crested Grebe 
Device A mechanism with a 
heterocatalytic function (it 
makes something that is not a 
copy of itself) 
Machinery of DNA transcription and 
translation, stem cell, brains (‘making 
behaviours’) 
Proper function An effect for which a character 
is an adaptation (where 
‘adaptation’ includes 
exaptations which have been 
subject to purifying selection 
in the recent past) 
Proper function of 16SrRNA gene is 
to code for 16SrRNA; Proper 
functions of femur include 
strengthening hindlimb, 
haematopoesis, etc; Proper function 
of courtship display is to create pair 
bond 
Normal How something was 
historically when the function 
was successfully performed, 
as in ‘Normal environment’, 
‘Normal character’, ‘Normal 
explanation’. See Section 3.4 
for discussion. 
Normal environment for a 
spermatazoon to perform the function 
of swimming in accordance with a 
Normal explanation (see Millikan 
1984, 34) includes acidic vaginal 
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